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Summary 
 
In the context of widespread interest in the impact of Chinese investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), this paper focuses on SSA’s engagement with 
large state-owned Chinese firms investing in SSA’s resource and 
infrastructure sectors. Evidence is provided on the extent of different types of 
Chinese investment, before focusing on the distinctive character of large scale 
state-owned Chinese investors. Chinese investments are closely bundled with 
aid and trade. The paper concludes that SSA countries should maximise the 
opportunities opened to them by their resource-base by adopting a similarly 
integrated and focused response to Chinese (and other large) investors who 
seek to draw on the continent’s natural resources. 
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Why is Foreign Direct Investment Important? 
 
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has 
grown rapidly in recent years. Despite the paucity of evidenced research on 
its magnitude and character a stream of general papersi have noted its rapid 
growth and significance and have identified key policy challenges designed to 
enable SSA to maximise the potential gains and minimise the potential losses 
from this incoming FDI. A general theme in these various contributions has 
been with “the impact of China on Africa”, generally marching under the 
banner “Whilst China has a strategy for Africa, Africa lacks a strategy for 
China”. But the problem with this formulation of the China challenge is that it 
assumes an homogenous “China” and an homogenous “Africa”. 
 
In this paper we seek to refine our understanding of what is meant by “China” 
in the phrase “Chinese FDI in SSA”. Here, emerging research suggests four 
distinct families of FDI flowing from China to SSA.  We identify these streams 
of FDI, and place them in historical context, noting both the dynamism of 
these investment flows and the paucity of primary research on their character 
and size. Then, in the context of a sustained rise in the global demand for 
commodities, we focus on the family of large, predominantly state-owned 
Chinese firms (state-owned enterprises, SOEs) operating in the resource and 
infrastructure sectors, pointing to their integration with Chinese aid and trade. 
It is here that we place Chinese FDI into global context, suggesting that it is 
distinctive in comparison to northern FDI in the resource and infrastructure 
sectors in SSA. This is followed by a discussion of a suitable policy response 
by African actors to allow for net gains to be maximised in the continent’s 
intercourse with these large-scale SOE investments from China. 
 
 
The Dynamics of Chinese FDI Flows to SSA. 
 
China’s relations with Africa in the modern era have passed through three 
overlapping phases. The first phase followed the Bandung Conference of 
Non-Aligned Nations in 1955, and resulted in almost four decades of what 
might be termed “Third World Solidarity”. Partly driven by its ideological rivalry 
with the Soviet Union, China offered decolonising Africa moral and political 
support, in some cases coupled with limited military support and aid.ii The 
period from the mid-1990s onwards – the subject of the analysis below – 
represents the second phase of Chinese involvement with SSA. Following a 
substantial growth in China’s trade with Africa, and China’s growing need for 
resources, large and predominantly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) entered 
SSA as investors and as contractors to Chinese-aid-funded projects in 
infrastructure and public buildings.iii The third and emergent phase of Chinese 
interaction with SSA is one involving small and medium sized, predominantly 
private-sector, enterprises. These comprise a mixture of firms. Some are 
incorporated in China and have extended their operations from China to SSA. 
Others have been started ab initio in SSA. In some cases this new vintage of 
investors involves Chinese citizens who had previously been employed in 
large scale SOE activity in Africa and, through various legal and illegal means, 
had stayed on to become autonomous entrepreneurs. In other cases, building 
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on family or community links, migrants have moved to SSA to join existing 
enterprises or to start new ones (Mohan and Kale, 2007; Dobler, 2008). 
 
These three ideal-types of overlapping Chinese investors in SSA are 
characterised in Figures 1 and 2. The phrases “state-owned” and “private” 
require some qualification, since one of the unique features of China’s recent 
growth trajectory has been the very fuzzy lines drawn on ownership between 
the state and private sector. Many “SOEs” function as conduits for private 
gain, in the sense that profits are appropriated in part by key individuals who 
are not formal owners of the firms. Similarly, the returns from, and decisions 
made in many apparently “private” firms are in part a reflection of the direct 
decision-making power of state bodies, particularly provincial governments. 
“Private” in China means that the state holds less than 50 percent of the 
equity. In addition, state officials may also own companies, but in their ‘private 
capacity’, and often use the connections gained through their government 
positions. Thus ownership in China reflects a complex and dynamic amalgam 
of property rights which Nolan characterises as an “ownership maze” with 
“vaguely defined property rights” (Nolan, 2005: 169). 
 
The large SOEs, predominantly investing in resource extraction and 
infrastructure, can be segmented between those owned by the Central 
Government and accountable to the State Council, and those accountable to 
provincial governments. Central government SOEs tend to operate under 
formal state-to-state agreements, whereas the provincially-owned firms often 
reflect the initiatives of their decentralised state administrations and often 
build on regional diasporas in SSA (see Gu in this volume). The private sector 
firms cover the spectrum of medium and small firms incorporated in China 
and investing in SSA, perhaps as a first venture outside of their home base. 
They also include a limited number of very large firms, such as Huawei in 
telecoms. The large and medium China-based firms generally operate in the 
manufacturing and communications sectors, as well as in wholesale trading. 
The other end of the private spectrum involves small to micro enterprises, 
either in petty manufacturing or in small scale retail.  
 
This paper is primarily focused on the Chinese SOE FDI in SSA.  
 
 
 
Insert Fig 1 here 
 
  
Insert Fig 2 here 
 
 
 
Chinese FDI in SSA 
Estimates of FDI flows are notoriously inaccurate. Each country estimates 
these flows in their annual balance of payments accounts and these data are 
used by the IMF, UNCTAD and other agencies to record official flows. In 
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previous years, exchange control regimes meant that commercial banks kept 
a record of FDI inflows, providing some consistent reporting procedure for 
estimating these flows. However, the removal of exchange controls over the 
past few decades has made the reporting procedure much more haphazard 
and inconsistent. The difficulty in measuring reinvestment by existing foreign 
investors compounds these measurement problems. Relatively weak 
recording practices in SSA increase the unreliability of data on Chinese 
investment flows to SSA.  
In what follows we report four sets of estimates of the extent and nature of 
these flows. The first draws on official estimates of flows. The second is 
based on a series of country-studies in SSA made as part of the African 
Economic Research Consortium’s Asian driver programme 
(www.aercafrica.org). The third reports the results of a UNIDO survey of FDI 
in SSA, and the final set \draws on the limited number of primary studies 
focusing on small scale Chinese investors in SSA. 
 
Official and public-domain estimates of the extent and distribution of 
Chinese FDI in SSA 
 
As China began to emerge in the international global scene, its outward FDI 
flows remained small; equivalent to just $916m. in 2000, not much higher than 
the $830m registered in 1990. However, post 2000, FDI outflows have been 
rising, reaching $17.8bn in 2006. The flows are expected to continue to 
increase, and to reach $72bn by 2011 (EIU, 2007).  
 
Official estimates of China’s FDI flows to SSA are contradictory, confusing 
and almost certainly understate their true significance. Drawing on a variety of 
official sources, Besada et al estimate that Chinese FDI flows into Africa 
exceeded $500m in 2006, rising from $400m in 2005 (Besada et. al, 2008). 
The more widely-used UNCTAD data, working with country estimates of 
investment-flows tell a similar story of rising Chinese FDI into SSA, albeit with 
somewhat different numbers. These data suggest inflows rising from $1.5m in 
1991 to $61m in 2003. UNCTAD estimates that in 2005 the stock of Chinese 
FDI in 48 African countries reached a value of $1.6bn.. Although China’s FDI 
in Africa is geographically dispersed, five countries (Sudan, Algeria, Zambia, 
Nigeria and South Africa) accounted for 56 percent of the FDI stock in 2005 
(Table 1)  
 
 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
 
In 1995, Africa’s share of China’s FDI outflows fluctuated around a low base, 
rising from 0.2 percent in 1991 to 3.2 percent in 2005, with a peak of 9.28 
percent in 2000. The  forthcoming large investment in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) (see below), as well as in other SSA countries, 
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suggest that both the absolute magnitude of FDI flows to SSA, and SSA’s 
share in total outward Chinese FDI, will continue to rise in future years. 
UNCTAD data suggest that China’s investment in Africa as a whole, and SSA 
in particular, is fairly well distributed across different sectors. Between 1979-
2000, 46 percent of investment was in the manufacturing sector. Most of this 
manufacturing investment was in the clothing sector, initially taking advantage 
of quota access through the Multifibre Agreement and then after 2001 also 
taking advantage of Africa’s preferential access to US markets under the 
AGOA scheme (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008).iv Services, mainly construction, 
accounted for 18 percent of the FDI flows, with resource extraction accounting 
for 28 percent. China’s FDI in oil and gas exploration has been concentrated 
in Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Gabon. Investments valued 
at $757m in Sudanese Oil and $2.7bn in Nigerian oilfields have been made in 
the past few years by China (Africa Frontier Advisory March, 2008) This is a 
dynamic picture however, and in 2007 the state-owned Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China invested $5.4bn to acquire a 20 percent strategic 
stake in Standard Bank, a South Africa based bank with extensive operations 
across the continent with a view to leveraging investment in a range of sectors 
and in a range of SSA economies.v  
UNCTAD estimated that in 2006 approximately 700 Chinese enterprises were 
operating in Africa, including in three of its first eight overseas economic and 
trade cooperation zones in Africa located in Nigeria, Mauritius and Zambia 
(UNCTAD, 2007b). The first Sino-African Business Conference in 2003 in 
Ethiopia resulted in commitments to 20 projects with a total value of $680m, 
although there are no reports of the extent to which these commitments 
resulted in actual investment flows (Broadman, 2007: 245)  
AERC Scoping Study estimates of the extent and distribution of Chinese 
FDI in SSA 
In 2006-7, the African Economic Research Consortium undertook scoping 
studies in 20 SSA countries to assess their trade, aid and investment relations 
with China. Each of these studies were undertaken by national researchers, 
and was based on national data sources on the nature of Chinese FDI 
inflows. These studies were more concerned with mapping the historical 
context of links with China and the nature of FDI flows than with estimating 
their value.  
Drawing on these reports (www.aercafrica.org/publications/category.asp) we 
can distinguish three groups of economies – those in which Chinese FDI 
plays a relatively significant role, those in which it plays a relatively moderate 
role, and those in which its significance is low. Table 2 below summarises the 
data from these scoping studies and identifies the key sectors where Chinese 
investment is located.  
 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
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The scoping studies show that oil-gas and mining investments are of 
considerable significance in some economies. However, there are economies 
where although Chinese FDI does take place in these sectors, its significance 
is low (for example, Cameroon in oil, and Kenya and Uganda in mining). In 
agriculture, the primary sector of Chinese involvement is cotton, but only in 
Zambia does it play an important role in this sector. Chinese FDI in telecoms 
is widespread throughout the 20 economies, and where this occurs, it plays a 
relatively important role. There are also significant investments in utilities 
(notably in Ethiopia and Mali). It is the construction and infrastructure sector 
where Chinese FDI is most pervasively evident, with much of the physical 
infrastructure investment in show-piece construction – government buildings 
and sport stadiums. FDI in manufacturing is primarily in labour intensive 
activities – garments dominate. But there is also a spread of investments in 
small scale manufacturing enterprises, which do not surface in official 
statistics but, like Chinese retail traders, may have a more substantial socio-
economic impact. Small-scale petty-trading by Chinese migrants is 
widespread in almost every economy, but is almost always unrecorded. 
Finally, South Africa is something of a special case. On the one hand, 
Chinese FDI into South Africa is relatively insignificant as a percentage of 
total FDI in the country. But, on the other, the size of this FDI is large relative 
to Chinese FDI in other SSA countries. Furthermore, Chinese FDI in South 
Africa’s banking sector provides it with a platform for extended FDI in other 
SSA economies. 
 
UNIDO’s survey of FDI in SSAvi 
 
In 2005 UNIDO conducted a survey of 1,216 foreign enterprises operating in 
15 African economies. This was a base-survey establishing a platform for 
future repeated surveys of a much larger sample of firms, and although it 
does not comprise a stratified sample of investments, it dose provide insights 
into the relative positioning of Chinese FDI in SSA. Comparing Chinese, 
Indian and South African and northern investors (Table 3), Chinese firms were 
younger, had lower sales per worker (but with higher sales growth), were 
more export-oriented and had low investment rates and low annual wages. 
The data suggest that Chinese respondent firms were disproportionately 
clustered in low value added export-oriented low-wage assembly operations 
(no doubt taking advantage of AGOA and Everything but Arms [EBA] 
incentives in the US and Europe). In fact, nearly one-third of the Chinese 
reporting firms produced textiles and garments, whereas the Indian firms in 
the survey tended to cluster in metals- and chemicals-manufacturing and the 
South African firms in the service sector.  
 
However, because this survey was a pilot of an ongoing programme and no 
attempt was made to interview a stratified sample of firms, it is not clear from 
this data whether these differences in FDI characteristics are a function of the 
country of origin of the investors, the countries in which they are investing (15 
of 54 African economies) or the particular sectors in which respondents 
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operated. The response rate between source country firms also varied, 
particularly in the case of Chinese firms (see Table 3). Moreover, there are no 
data on the population of Indian, South African or northern investors – let 
alone of Chinese investors – so we do not know whether the survey 
respondents provide an accurate picture of these different sources of FDI in 
SSA.   
 
 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
 
 
 Primary studies of small private sector Chinese FDI 
 
The source of Chinese FDI that is much harder to track, but with increasingly 
significant socio-economic impact, is the growth in private sector investment. 
Gu (in this volume) reports Chinese EXIM Bank estimates of around 800 
China-incorporated firms who have established operations in SSA as a 
whole.vii However, on the basis of her own primary research in China and in 
SSA, she estimates the number of private firms to be more than 2,000, 
predominantly operating in manufacturing and trade. Although no numbers 
are provided on employment, most of these firms appear to be on the small-
size-of-medium, with only a few large firms such as Huawei Technologies and 
the Holley Group 
A second set of primary research on Chinese private sector firms is that on 
Mauritius (Brautigam, 2008). Brautigam builds on various reports of small 
scale investments, predominantly in light engineering, in a number of SSA 
economies (including Angola, Benin, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia) to focus on private sector 
investments in Mauritius. She shows how this in large part results from a long 
history of Chinese immigration, reinforcing the importance of diasporas in 
private sector FDI. Chinese firms investing in the export processing zones 
(predominantly in clothing) alone numbered 89 in 2000-2006, with an 
additional 50 from Hong Kong. Chinese private investors are also to be found 
in other sectors of the economy such as in sugar processing. Mauritius (as is 
South Africa) is something of a special case, however, due to the longevity of 
the Chinese community, with reports of Chinese firms dating from as far back 
as 1874. The special nature of Mauritius is evident from Brautigam’s matching 
case-study of Nigeria where she shows that Chinese influence in the small 
scale manufacturing sector is high, but as a source of imported technology 
and inputs rather than investment or skills. 
The final set of research on private sector investment relates to small scale 
individual or family owned firms operating predominantly in small scale trade 
and petty manufacturing. A large and almost entirely unrecorded number of 
Chinese individuals operate as small scale entrepreneurs in selected 
countries (Mohan and Kale, 2007; Mohan and Power, 2008; Dobler, 2008), for 
example, in Angola, Namibia and Madagascar. A relatively new and 
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significant, but as yet small set of trading entrepreneurs are Chinese 
wholesalers in Kenya, South Africa and Uganda who act as a platform for 
associated retailing activities in neighbouring countries by other Chinese small 
scale migrant entrepreneurs (so-called ”platform economies”).viii These, too, 
are widely observed but are not systematically recorded. 
 
How Distinctive is Chinese FDI in SSA? 
 
Despite the paucity of the research surveyed in Section 3 above, there are 
reasons to believe that the SOE category of Chinese FDI in SSA is 
predominantly clustered in large-scale resource oriented ventures (Burke and 
Corkin, 2006; Broadman, 2007: 275; Ajakaiye et al, 2008). The reasons for 
this sectoral concentration are discussed below before we show how these 
SOE investments are predominantly bundled with Chinese aid in projects 
designed to meet China resource needs. This then allows us to consider the 
distinctive nature of Chinese SOE investment on the continent in the 
concluding discussion.  
 
 
Terms of trade reversal and the growing importance of resources 
 
Since at least the 1870s, there has been a long-run trend for the terms of 
trade to turn against the commodities sector. That is, prices of manufactures 
have risen faster than (or fallen slower than) those of commodities. There 
have been occasional spikes in the general prices of commodities, notably in 
the early 1920s, the 1950s and the 1970s. But in each case these were short-
lived price rises, (“cycles”) reflecting commodity demands in periods of wars, 
or in post-war reconstruction. All of these occasional spikes were temporary in 
nature (Kaplinsky, 2009). Specific commodities have seen more frequent 
price rises, such as in the price of coffee, cocoa and other commodities. 
These have largely arisen as a consequence of environmental and climatic 
factors. 
 
However, between 2001 and 2008 prices boomed across the spectrum of 
commodities. This comprised a longer period than previous commodity price 
spikes and represents a “super-cycle”. There are sound reasons to believe 
that this will remain the case for some years to come (a “secular shift” or 
“structural break” in the terms of trade) despite the financial-sector induced 
bust after August 2008.ix This is because unlike previous periods of price-rise, 
the current boom is fuelled by a massive augmentation of demand in the very 
large Asian Driver economies which have a high income-elasticity of demand 
for commodities (IMF, 2007; Farooki, 2009). Inter alia, this affects the demand 
for energy (and has spin-offs into agriculture due to the resulting drive towards 
bio-fuels), for minerals (largely for infrastructure, but also for manufactures) 
and food crops (as Chinese and Indian demand grows for meat products, and 
hence animal feeds) (FAO, 2007; Freeman, Holslag and Weil, 2009). Primary 
commodities are therefore likely to remain in relatively short supply globally, 
and prices are likely to be sustained for some years to come.  
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How does this demand for commodities affect SSA? Africa is especially well 
favoured by these developments, not so much in terms of its existing 
commodity exports, but rather in terms of its potential exports. Table 4 shows 
that in many mineral commodities, Africa is the primary resource base for the 
future. In energy, it is not so much Africa’s share of global reserves which is 
so strategically important, but its reserves of unallocated reserves. New 
hydrocarbon discoveries off the west coast of Africa, as well as in Uganda, 
and the potential for oil discoveries in other parts of Africa, make it an 
exceptionally attractive region for countries with rapidly-growing energy 
needs. Significantly, the African continent is only poorly prospected, so the 
likelihood is that the estimates of reserves in Table 4 (as well as in regard to 
commodities not in this Table) are a significant underestimate of Africa’s 
resource potential. 
 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
 
These growing constraints in the resource sector have considerable 
importance in explaining the nature and growth of Chinese FDI into SSA. As 
we have seen, a large component of this FDI has been in the resource and 
infrastructure sectors (see, also Burke and Corkin, 2006: Broadman, 2007; 
Ajakaiye et al, 2008). Much of these infrastructure investments is focused on 
providing transport routes for the export of resources. For example there have 
been large investments in an oil pipeline and associated port facilities in 
Sudan. In Gabon, CEMEC (a large state owned enterprise) is constructing a 
special-purpose deep-water port at Santa Clara, a railway track running 560 
km from Belinga to the coast and a hydro-electric power plant to facilitate the 
energy required for the operations. It is a long-term project, intended to extend 
over 15-20 years, and will involve not only the extraction of the iron ore, but 
the development of auxiliary products (Burke and Corkin, 2006:94). China has 
made extensive commitments to construct a rail-route to facilitate the 
exploitation of mineral ores and timber. In Angola, the refurbishment of the rail 
network is also linked strategically to the export potential of resources. The 
railway line will run 1,300 km from Benguela to Luau, on the DRC and also 
has a link to Lobito, 700 km south of Luanda. This is significant as there is a 
strong possibility that extensions will be added to Uige and Zambia, providing 
a direct line of transport from the Zambian copper mines to the Angolan ports. 
The project, while restoring an important transport backbone to Angola, will 
also thus facilitate the access to Angola’s ports for Zambia’s extracted copper. 
(Burke and Corkin, 2006:49).  
 
 
The strategic integration of Chinese operations in SSA 
 
With the exception of small scale copper mining smelters in Zambia and the 
DRC, virtually all of these resource-based Chinese investments have been 
large in scale and have involved Chinese SOE (both central state SOEs and 
provincial government SOEs). In all these sectors China has become a 
significant global importer (http://www.commodities.open.ac.uk/cpd). In all 
9 
 
these sectors, particularly in infrastructure for trade (Foster et. al., 2008), 
Chinese aid has complemented these trade and FDI flows. 
 
The close link between trade, FDI and financial flows has historical 
precedents. In the Colonial era these three vectors were fused and the 
imperial powers’ interests in SSA were closely coordinated. For example, in 
the immediate post-war period, British Colonies were seen as providers of 
traded commodities for UK consumers, involving FDI from UK firms (for 
example, producing tea in Kenya), with infrastructure to support this trade 
provided by the UK Colonial Office (roads and ports to transport the tea to the 
UK). French and Portuguese presence in SSA was coordinated in a similar 
way.  
 
But as Africa was decolonised in the second half of the 20th Century, the aid, 
trade and FDI vectors were increasingly separated. This separation occurred 
for a number of reasons. First, there was increasing opposition from SSA 
countries who saw this integration as being very costly. For example, tied aid 
generally led to much higher-cost inputs. Second, new economic actors were 
entering the field (notably the US) and they complained that the integration of 
vectors locked them out of markets. Third, there was growing public 
opposition in the OECD economies against what was seen as a framework for 
the exploitation of many low income economies.  Fourth, multilateral aid grew 
in importance and the International Financial Institutions have increasingly 
insisted on the delinking of aid, trade and FDI.  
 
China’s presence in SSA provides a real departure from this recent orthodoxy 
of the separation of aid, trade and FDI and represents a reversion to the 
historical precedent of colonial links between mother countries and SSA 
colonies. Particularly in the case of large scale infrastructural and mining 
projects, this takes the form of the strategic integration of various inputs from 
China. It is for this reason that it is virtually impossible to unbundle what 
constitutes Chinese “aid” and “FDI” (Ajakaiye et al, 2008). The so-called 
“Angola-model” has become a framework for much of China’s SOE activity in 
SSA. It describes an integrated package in which China’s EXIM Bank 
provides a line of credit, generally at subsidised interests rates. Large 
Chinese firms then tender for large infrastructural and resource projects, such 
as those in Angola which cover mining, oil and railways. Most of these funds 
are tied to the use of Chinese inputs, and make intensive use of Chinese 
skills; they also involve investment by Chinese firms in Africa. The bulk of 
these “aid” funds never leave China but are transferred directly from the EXIM 
Bank to the (largely SOE) firms which have won the tenders for the work. 
These funds are not grants, but are repaid by the recipient country as a 
drawdown on commodity exports back to China. Although typically, the costs 
of these large infrastructural projects are 20-30 percent lower than those of 
northern, South African and Brazilian competitors, local content in the African 
recipient economies is low (Burke and Corkin, 2006). But not all aid follows 
the Angola-mode. China also provides aid for politically sensitive and 
prestigious projects but these are often in economies where it has a direct 
resource interest and where seeks to build a long-term presence such as 
sports stadia in the DRC and Angola. 
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 China’s investment in SSA: A departure from trend? 
 
The most widely-used framework for assessing the drivers of FDI is that 
developed over the years by Dunning (see, for example, Dunning 2000 in his 
“eclectic theory of foreign investment”. Dunning identified three primary 
explanatory factors, the so-called OLI (ownership, location, internalisation) 
framework.  
 
The “ownership” factor describes motivations which reflect the nature of the 
firms involved, analysing their particular special competences which provide 
them with a global reach, the power to control their foreign affiliates and the 
capabilities which they possess which make them an attractive source of 
finance and technology to other countries. The “location” factor explains why 
foreign firms operate in a particular country. This may because of market 
possibilities for the output of the foreign ventures (“market seeking FDI”), 
because the country possesses scarce natural resources (“resource seeking 
FDI”), or because the country has low operating costs (“cost reducing FDI”) 
which make it an attractive export platform. The “internalisation” factor 
explains why foreign firms prefer to own their operations in other countries, as 
opposed to licensing out, or selling their technologies and skills to domestic 
firms or other foreign firms. 
 
In recent years, a fourth factor has been suggested as explaining a new form 
of outward FDI from the Asian Tigers, and especially in relation to their 
investments in high-income economies (Mathews, 2002). This is the 
“linkages” driver, in which firms invest abroad not so much to exploit their firm-
competences (as in the OLI explanation), but in order to augment these 
competences by learning from their overseas operations. Whilst there is a 
debate about whether this “leveraging” FDI is really a new form of FDI (since it 
arguably reflects firm-competences in business strategy and technology 
acquisition) (Dunning, 2006; Narula, 2006), there certainly does seem to have 
been a distinctly new flow of outward FDI from low income economies such as 
China, India and Brazil. New, that is, in relation to their previous outward 
investments which have predominantly exploited firm-specific advantages in 
product and process technologies and competed on price rather than product 
differentiation (Lall, 1984; Lecraw, 1977; Wells, 1983) 
 
Utilising the Dunning framework (as augmented by Mathews) and also 
considering the issue of the bundling of aid, trade and FDI, is it possible to 
compare these large investments by Chinese SOEs into SSA’s resource-
sector and related infrastructure with those of the historically dominant 
northern firms which have until recently been the primary resource and 
infrastructure investors in SSA? Our conclusions are as follows (and are 
summarised in Table 5). First, with respect to the strategic integration of aid, 
trade and investment, Chinese SOE FDI in SSA is distinctive. Over the past 
decades, despite some differences between different nationalities of Northern 
investors, in general there has been an unbundling of Northern investment 
from aid and trade. Where investment has taken place in export sectors, 
these exports have been into global markets, rather than to the domestic 
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markets of the investors. By contrast, most incoming FDI from China has 
reflected a relatively tight bundling of investment with tied-aid, designed to 
facilitate the export of natural resources, predominantly directly to China.  
 
 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
  
 
In terms of ownership characteristics, in general northern firms investing in 
SSA have been funded, directly or indirectly, through stock markets. The 
growing emphasis on “shareholder value” over the past two decades has 
generally meant that this funding regime has had a short-term profit objective 
and has been very risk-averse. By contrast, with access to cheap (and often 
subsidised) long-term capital, Chinese SOEs firms operate with distinctive 
long-term time-horizons and are less risk-averse than their northern 
counterparts (Tull, 2006; Zeng and Williamson, 2007; see also Section 5.1 
below). It is significant that the exception to this has been small investments 
by Chinese privately owned firms, for example in Zambian and DRC copper 
smelting. These private firms are much more like the risk-averse and short-
term-profit oriented northern firms. When the global copper price fell in early 
2009, more than 40 small smelters in the DRC were abandoned over a 
weekend with their owners vanishing without paying taxes or paying their staff 
(Jopson, 2009). Finally, most northern firms’ operations in SSA are 
constrained in various envelopes of conditionality including the Paris 
Declaration, the Accra Accord and various specific agreements and standards 
affecting, inter alia, labour rights, the environment, product specifications and 
the transparency of investment decisions. By contrast, Chinese SOEs operate 
in a relatively unfettered environment. They are able, for example, to continue 
investing and operating oil and infrastructure activities in Sudan as part of a 
bilateral agreement. This is despite the international pressures exerted on the 
Darfur problem, which forced a Canadian oil firm to divest from the Sudan. 
 
With respect to the location-specific factors, resource-seeking investments are 
found in both Northern and Chinese FDI in SSA. However, unlike Chinese 
FDI, many large northern TNCs have operations in SSA which are focused on 
meeting the needs of domestic consumers in local markets, and occasionally 
also in regional markets. Many of these investments are long-lived, and reflect 
previous decades of protected import-substituting industrialisation. By 
contrast, a relatively small component (by overall value) of Chinese FDI – 
particularly by large Chinese firms and especially by SOEs - has been market 
seeking. A notable exception has been in telecommunications, involving the 
SOE ZTE. The use of SSA as a low-cost export platform is largely confined to 
the garments sector, and reflects tariff preferences in major northern markets, 
predominantly AGOA to the US but also Cotinou and EBA preferences in the 
EU. Here Asian investors in general, and some Chinese firms in particular, 
have a distinctively larger presence than do northern foreign investors. Finally, 
SSA provides protected space (that is, from many northern competitors) to 
firms which are not subject to various codes of behaviour.x This provides 
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special incentives to Chinese foreign investors to locate their resource-sector 
and other investments in SSA rather than in more regulated environments 
 
Learning factors also play a more important role in respect of Chinese SSA 
investment than Northern FDI. Chinese firms are distinctive in their use of 
SSA as a test-bed for overseas investments in general. For many firms, SSA 
is an important proving ground in the industrial and service sectors. As a 
Chinese hotel manager in Sierra Leone observed, ‘Africa is a good 
environment for Chinese investment, because it’s not too competitive,’ 
(Hilsum 2005). The substantial but minority investment in Standard Bank of 
South Africa is an example of using a partnership to gain valuable expertise in 
respect of northern financial service provision. There is little evidence that 
such learning-oriented investments are evidenced for previous generations of 
northern FDI, at least not over the past three-to-four decades.  
 
Finally, although some Chinese garment exporters incorporate their SSA 
garments operations in their clothing exports to the US, these are only very 
isolated examples of their integration of SSA subsidiaries in global value 
chains. By contrast, although relatively limited, some northern firms do 
integrate their African subsidiaries in their global value chains. These are 
most notable in the beverages and agricultural commodities sectors and, in 
South Africa, in the automobile and mining-equipment and mining-services 
sectors. 
 
Conclusion: Policy Implications for Engaging with Large Chinese 
Dragons  
 
FDI makes both positive and negative contributions to the host economies. 
The balance of outcomes is generally determined contextually, reflecting a 
variety of sectoral, temporal and geo-strategic factors, often determined at a 
global level. However, the outcomes, and the balance of developmental 
advantage, also reflect the particular policy-environment which host countries 
adopt. Hence, what conclusions can be drawn about optimal policy responses 
by SSA economies to ensure that the threat posed by the entrance of Chinese 
FDI is turned into developmental opportunity? This requires a focus both on 
the development of strategic capabilities, and the roles played by key 
developmental actors. Its also necessarily places a focus on the patterns and 
effectiveness of governance and its legitimacy. The discussion which follows 
relates specifically to the very large state-orchestrated investments from 
China in SSA’s resource and infrastructure sectors. 
 
 
Developing strategic capabilities 
 
SSA, as we have seen, is not without its attractions to Chinese investors, 
particularly with regard to its potential as a source of natural resources. The 
key, therefore, is for SSA to use this power in commodities to its best 
advantage in its relations with the new emerging powers, particularly in the 
exploitation of these mineral resources and in the provision of related 
infrastructure. The agreement which the DRC reached with China in 2007 and 
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2008 shows the potential for using this power to leverage advantageous 
terms, particularly as China and other emerging economies seek to muscle 
their way into territories which were previously the domain of northern 
economic powers. It is not just that an agreement was constructed through 
which the DRC was able to crowd-in aid-assisted Chinese investments in 
infrastructure and training, and to ensure minimum local content, with local co-
ownership in mineral exploitation.  But it was also that it was able to use this 
leverage provided by China to force the renegotiation of 61 long-term mining 
agreements which had previously been reached with northern firms 
(Vandaele, 2008; Komesaroff, 2009; Wild 2009).  
 
The context is one in which the DRC possesses extensive mineral resources, 
but lacks the resources or technology to exploit these. (The total DRC state 
budget in 2007 was only $1.3bn, most of which was used to pay salaries). 
Before the elections in 2006, the DRC government had approved a large 
number of 35-year mining contracts in agreements which were not 
transparent. Reacting to international concern, the new incoming government 
began a process of reviewing 61 mining contracts entered into between 1997 
and 2003. The ability to review these contracts was strengthened by the 
existence of an alternative path to exploiting the DRC’s extensive mineral 
deposits, in large part by the Chinese aid-trade-FDI package signed in 2007 
and 2008.  
 
This constituted two large, but related, initiatives, utilising the “Angola mode”. 
The first, entered into in late 2007, involved a loan for $8.5bn from the 
Chinese EXIM Bank. This was to promote exploitation of the mining sector, 
and was supplemented with a further $5bn loan in early 2008. Together, these 
loans were securitised by providing China with access to, and security 
provided by $14bn of copper and cobalt reserves. This aid was tied to an 
investment package to exploit these mineral resources by a jointly owned 
company, Socomin, owned by a Chinese (68 percent) and Congolese (32 
percent) state-owned companies. The $3bn investment in the mines will be 
repaid out of future profits. By agreement, not more than 20 percent of the 
workforce can be Chinese, 0.5 percent of investment will be allocated to 
training, a further one percent will be spent on social investments and three 
percent on environmental projects in the surrounding areas. In addition, at 
least 12 percent of the work will be sub-contracted to local firms. 
 
In addition to these investments in mines, China committed to provide support 
for investments in five key areas identified by the DRC state – in water, 
electricity generation, education, health and transport. $8.5bn will be allocated 
to a variety of projects which include a high-voltage power distribution 
network, highway and railway extensions, and the construction of 31 
hospitals, 145 health clinics, 5,000 houses and two universities. Additional 
resources are allocated to rehabilitate and expand water supplies. 
Supplementing all of this are a range of additional aid projects, including 
training programmes in China for poverty reduction and subsidised loans to 
construct the national People’s Palace (the parliament) and the Stadium of the 
Martyrs outdoor and sports complex. Reacting against this “new kid on the 
block”, in early 2009 the IMF sought to block this investment, arguing that the 
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DRC could not enter into a new arrangement with a privileged preferential 
creditor when it still owed northern creditors $11.5bn. The DRC government 
and the Chinese investors however reaffirmed their commitment to this large 
investment in March 2009. 
 
SSA countries can learn from the DRC experience (which is, of course, not 
without its flaws, most notably in the criteria to be utilised to value resource 
exports in the context of fluctuating global prices). In developing a strategic 
agenda, SSA countries can benefit from adopting a similar strategy of 
integrating the aid, trade and FDI vectors to that which is being pursued most 
clearly by Chinese SOEs entering SSA. Increasingly, also, the same strategy 
is being pursued by large Indian firms investing in SSA’s resource and 
infrastructure sectors. Meeting China’s trade needs – SSA as a source of 
primary commodities and, to a lesser extent, as a market for their exports – 
should be conditional upon their providing aid to exploit these commodities, as 
well as to meet SSA’s complementary developmental and infrastructural 
needs. Where appropriate, it should also incorporate Chinese FDI, and 
participation in Chinese firm’s value chains which serve global markets. For 
example, Chinese firms exporting garments to the US and the EU (as well as 
footwear and other sectors where SSA has resources which are relatively 
easily transformed into final products) may be induced to include SSA 
subsidiaries and SSA firms into their global value chains. Embedding this 
bundling in formal agreements would of course be WTO-illegal. But the scale 
of these SOE resource-based investments is so large that SSA governments 
are inevitably drawn into the negotiations. An agreement on bundling can be 
reached in an informal manner through government-to-government 
discussions without running-up against WTO rules. After all, China is a 
member of the WTO itself and manages to informally adopt a bundling 
strategy without any adverse affect on WTO procedures. 
 
Policy actors 
 
The issue is who in SSA is going to drive this strategic agenda towards FDI 
inflows from China? At the most basic level, this must necessarily involve 
individual SSA governments. Although they do not generally directly control 
inward FDI and trade flows, they hold the key levers which determine access 
to their economies. Each of the governments needs to make a cool, informed 
assessment of its country’s specific attractions to incoming Chinese large-
scale FDI, to situate this in the context of global oligopolistic competition for 
access to resources, and then to coordinate an integrated strategic response 
to offer access to resources in a way which best meets their country’s needs. 
This will involve extensive background analysis, but also the convening of 
appropriate stakeholder groups to ensure an integrated approach providing 
clear signals to emerging country partners. But formal written strategies which 
are not implemented effectively are much less use than dynamic and active 
coalitions of local interests interacting effectively amongst themselves and 
with emerging country partners. 
 
Another arena for integrated response is in regional and all-Africa fora such 
as SADC, ECOWAS, NEPAD and the AU. These multi-country organisations 
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are important for three major and related reasons. First, by aggregating 
African countries in the bargaining process, they help to avoid contradictory 
bargaining positions and wars of incentives. As has been evident for many 
decades in the diamonds sector, there is enormous power in cartelised 
bargaining. This is not just a matter of achieving the best price for SSA’s 
resources, but also of ensuring that wider objectives can be met, such as the 
construction of regional infrastructural networks to provide access for non-
commodity exporters. Second, and related to this, as observed earlier, not all 
SSA countries have extensive commodity deposits or are significant 
commodity producers. Their interests need to be protected by those 
economies who do have primary resources and markets of interest to China 
and competitor investors. Including these marginalised economies is not just a 
matter of altruism for the commodity exporters. Intra-regional trade may be a 
primary area for the development of the capabilities which are required for 
long term and sustainable growth. Hence it is in the interests of all parties – 
commodity exporters and non-commodity exporters alike – that these intra-
regional links are strengthened as a consequence of engaging with the 
emerging economies. A final reason why the multi-country organisations are 
important is that the emerging economies themselves see these as important 
organisations for bargaining access to SSA’s resources and markets. This is 
most evident in the case of the FOCAC (Forum for China African 
Cooperation), but it is also relevant for other emerging economies as well. 
 
In conclusion, although we have pointed to the distinctive character of 
Chinese SOE driven FDI in SSA, and the opening this creates to negotiating 
bi- and multi-lateral aid and economic assistance agreements with China, this 
only addresses part of the problem. It is all very well undertaking the 
necessary research, developing appropriate policy, and then negotiating 
advantageous technical agreements with China at either a country or regional 
level. But the larger problem facing SSA governments is how it ensure that 
such policy and strategies stick? The real issue is whether SSA countries 
have the human resource capacity and institutional capability to design and 
negotiate these agreements eff3ctively, and then (perhaps more importantly) 
the political will and legitimacy to enforce them. enforce and gain maximum 
advantage from them. We know from the new institutional economics that 
institutional governance matters but this is the very area that SSA faces the 
greatest challenges. Without this implementing capacity, the agreements are 
likely to be notional, nothing more than granting strategic advantage to China 
in its interaction with Africa and its global diplomatic strategic initiatives under 
the cloak of a developmental agenda.  
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Figure 1: Four types of Chinese investors in SSA 
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Source: Adapted from Corkin (2009) and Gu (2009) 
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Figure 2: Size, sector and ownership of Chinese investors in SSA 
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21 
 
 
Tables to be inserted 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of China’s Outward FDI Stock in Africa, 1990, 2005 
(%) 
 
Country 1990 Country 2005 
Zaire 18 Sudan 22 
Nigeria 15 Algeria 11 
Mauritius 14 Zambia 10 
Guinea Bissau 9 South Africa 7 
Zambia 7 Nigeria 6 
Gabon 6 Tanzania 4 
Rwanda 6 Kenya 4 
Zimbabwe 6 Madagascar 3 
Egypt 4 Guinea 3 
Tanzania 4 Zimbabwe 3 
Madagascar 4 Others 27 
Central African Republic 3   
Sierra Leone 2   
Libya 2   
Source: UNCTAD (2007a) 
 
 
Table 2: Significance of Chinese FDI in key sectors in 20 SSA economies 
 
Country Oil/
gas 
Mining Agriculture Services Retail Physical 
infrastructure 
Manufacturing 
Economies where Chinese FDI plays a significant role 
Angola X    Telecoms 
 
Small 
traders 
Construction, 
Infrastructure  
 
Ethiopia  X  Telecoms, 
Electricity, 
Water 
Small 
traders 
Construction Garments, 
Shoes/leather 
Ghana   Poultry  Small 
traders, 
Import/
export 
 Garments, 
Shoes/leather 
Madagascar   Sugar Financial, 
Telecoms 
Small 
traders, 
Import/
export 
 Garments, 
general spread 
Nigeria X   Telecoms, 
Technical 
services 
Small 
traders 
Construction, 
infrastructure, 
Agro-processing 
Mauritius     Small 
traders, 
Import/
export 
 Textiles, 
Garments, 
General spread 
Sudan X X   Small 
traders 
  
Zambia  X Cotton,    Construction Agro-processing 
Economies where Chinese FDI plays a moderately significant role 
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Congo - 
Brazzaville 
   Health, 
Telecoms  
 Energy, 
Construction 
 
Kenya  X Coffee  Small 
traders, 
Import/
export 
 Garments, 
Shoes, General 
spread 
Mali   Cotton Electricity, 
Water 
 Construction, 
Infrastructure 
Food processing 
S. Africa    Financial Small 
traders 
Constructions, 
infrastructure, 
Electronic 
goods 
Uganda  X Cotton,  Telecoms, 
Electricity  
Small 
traders 
Construction, 
infrastructure, 
Agro-processing 
General spread 
Economies where Chinese FDI plays a  relatively insignificant role 
Cameroon X  Rice, 
Timber, Fish 
 Small 
traders 
Construction, 
Infrastructure 
 
Chad        
Cote d’Ivoire        
Gambia        
Guinea        
Namibia     Small 
traders 
Construction  
Tanzania   Cotton   Construction  
Source: Based on AERC Scoping Studies 2008  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Chinese, Indian, South African and northern FDI compared. 
 
 China India S Africa North 
Sample size (number of firms)* 27-46 41-64 51-82 430-632 
Age (yrs) 7 12 13.1 21.6 
Sales/worker $ 15,300 38,000 96,800 90,100 
Sales growth 2005 (%) 48.3 13.0 17.6 14.6 
Export/sales (%) 33.7 13.5 3.3 18.9 
Investment/sales ($) 27.9 70.7 27.4 32.7 
Annual wages ($) 1,104 2,106 7,428 5,869 
“  This represents the range of firm responses, given that not all firms responded to all 
questions 
Source: Henley et. al, 2009, drawn from UNIDO 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Africa’s Share Of Global Production and Reserves (percent)* 
 
Mineral Production Reserves 
Platinum Group 
Metals 
54 60+ 
Gold 20 42 
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Chromium 40 44 
Manganese 28 82 
Vanadium 51 95 
Cobalt 18 55+ 
Diamonds 78 88 
Aluminium 4 45 
* These are known reserves. However, given the underdevelopment of prospecting in SSA, 
the actual reserves are likely to be significantly higher 
Source: African Development Bank (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Chinese SOEs and Northern MNC FDI in SSA: Major features 
 
 Historic northern FDI Incoming large-scale 
Chinese SOE FDI 
Bundling of aid, trade and investment 
 
Strategic 
integration of aid, 
trade and FDI 
 
Low and falling 
High – aid and FDI bundled 
tightly, particularly in 
countries with natural 
resources 
Ownership specific factors 
 Short-term, profit oriented Long-term, resource-
seeking, integrated with 
Chinese government aims 
Location specific factors 
 
 
Resource-
seeking 
 
 
Market seeking 
 
 
Export platforms 
 
Natural resource seeking 
 
 
 
Producing for domestic market  
and trading 
 
Tariff preferences in US and 
 
Natural resource seeking 
with utilisation of bilateral 
aid agreements 
 
Trading 
 
 
Tariff preferences in US and 
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Learning linkages 
 
EU 
 
Virtually non-existent  
 
EU 
 
SSA as a test-bed for future 
FDI  
 
Internalisation factors 
 
 Agricultural commodities - 
beverages, cotton, autos in 
South Africa 
Garment exports under 
AGOA to the US 
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 The most visible project was the Tanzam railway linking Zambia with 
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 This phase mirrors Chinese FDI in general: "The bulk of China’s FDI was 
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commodities, prompting some observers to conclude that, at best, the post 
2001 rise in commodity prices represented a super-cycle rather than a 
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structural break in the terms of trade. However, this fall in commodity prices 
reflects the implosion of the financial sector. Just as the very large price 
upswing of 2006-2008 in part resulted from speculation in commodities by 
hedge funds, the very large fall in prices in late 2008 and early 2009 
represented an accentuated downswing as, in the search for liquidity, hedge 
funds unwound their speculative bets on commodities. The underlying 
fundamentals driving the demand for commodities suggest that the long-term 
structural break in the terms of trade will be sustained, albeit at a less extreme 
pace than in the super-cycle boom of 2006-2008 (Kaplinsky, 2009; UNCTAD, 
2006; Farooki, 2009). 
x
  Various codes of conduct such as those governing labour and 
environmental standards and financial transparency affect the operations of 
northern investors in SSA. In the clothing sector, one of the reasons why US 
buyers were reluctant to completely switch sourcing from SSA to China after 
the MFA quota removal in 2005 was that SSA producers had much higher 
labour standards and these were important in certain US niche markets 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008).  
